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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #7506-81/1  
20 November 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED] 25X1

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your  
information. [REDACTED] 25X12. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on  
17 November 1981 with the A/NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not  
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to  
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have  
significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] 25X1Attachment  
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## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 37

SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA

Analysts had no explanation why the South African military buildup in northern Namibia did not result in a major operation into southern Angola. There was speculation that perhaps one of the members of the Western Contact Group had learned of an impending operation and may have made a demarche to Pretoria to prevent another strike. Some Contact Group members are said to be concerned that the South African military operations are counterproductive to the negotiations on Namibia. [ ]

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There was general agreement that additional Cuban military personnel have arrived in Angola. [ ]

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[ ] perhaps some 3,000 to 8,000 Cubans could have arrived, raising our estimate of the total in Angola to 22,000-27,000. Considering that there has been almost uninterrupted South African activity throughout southern Angola since late July, it is not surprising that Havana felt it necessary to assist the Angolan government, though we are yet unable to say with any certainty how the new troops will be used. In any case, more Cuban personnel will heighten South African concerns and raise the possibility of military clashes between the two sides that have the effect of raising tensions and undercutting negotiations on Namibia. [ ]

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MOZAMBIQUE

The South African supported National Resistance Movement (NRM) is continuing its insurgency against the Machel regime. Its activities have recently been highlighted by significant sabotage activities against the Beira-Umtali pipeline that serves Zimbabwe and the important Mozambique port of Beira. One sign of the seriousness of NRM activity is the recent replacement of civilian governors with military officers in two Mozambique provinces in which the NRM is active. Machel has had very limited success in obtaining outside support from non-Communist sources, raising the question of whether Machel has little choice but to go to the Soviets and Cubans for more help. A Mozambique delegation was in Moscow in mid October [ ]

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\*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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CHAD

While analysts applauded the departure of the Libyans from Chad, there was a firm consensus that the problem of Chad will be with us for some time to come. The viability and effectiveness of the OAU peacekeeping force is highly questionable, particularly if, as many analysts believe, the Chadian political factions begin fighting again. Squabbling among the national contingents of the force is likely and would undermine its effectiveness. The U.S., France, and other Western countries may well find themselves supporting the OAU force for a longer time than first envisioned. The French seem willing to involve themselves in a long-term commitment, but the U.S. effort to support the force is now intended for a short period only. Concern was expressed that the US and the West will be blamed if the peacekeeping effort fails, particularly if factional fighting enables the Libyans to intervene again. [ ] 25X1

ETHIOPIA

Operation "Bright Star" is seriously alarming the Ethiopians. For Mengistu, "Bright Star" is symbolic of the US-Sudanese-Somali relationship that he believes threatens Ethiopia. In response, Mengistu may be planning anti-US activities that might include ousting some US officials from Addis Ababa. The government's action against foreign Protestant churches this week may be intended as a way to indicate to Ethiopians that the US and the West are stirring up trouble in Ethiopia, particularly among ethnic minorities in the country. Mengistu may also fear the US will try to convince Sudan to involve itself in Eritrea on the side of the Eritrean insurgents. [ ] 25X1

SUDAN

There is considerable concern in the Community that the economic austerity measures that President Nimeiri has instituted may spark serious popular unrest. Physical security measures in Khartoum have increased. [ ] 25X1

ZAIRE

The usual myriad of problems beset the Mobutu regime and there is always the chance that an incident of some sort could provide the spark that would set off the popular disturbances that many Mobutu-watchers have long feared. DIA is concerned that popular discontent with the regime has pervaded the lower officer ranks of the military and that this situation must be carefully watched in the weeks ahead. [ ] 25X1

LIBERIA

The scene continues marked by a worsening economic situation highlighted by a serious scarcity of hard currency that threatens to cut off credit for POL imports. The need for financial assistance apparently was the purpose of the foreign minister's recent trip to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Some analysts also fear that Doe's popularity is slipping. The recent student elections at the university were won by students highly critical of the regime's performance. While the elections were not necessarily indicative of the popular mood, analysts were concerned that if popular discontent begins to grow it could take on an anti-US flavor. [ ] 25X1

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ZAMBIA

Concern was expressed about the situation in Zambia. Labor restiveness, long an unsettling factor on the domestic scene, continues to simmer. Physical security around President Kaunda has clearly increased. ☐ 25X1

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Fred --

This is an example of the contribution I could make to the warning staff's examination of potential problems--geared to the NIOs' monthly meetings. Depending on how the system evolves, I might also participate in the staff's discussions of monthly agendas if you think this would be useful.

The "method" of these contributions would be to define potential warning problems, assess the principal actors' perceptions and intentions, project the options available to them, and--when feasible--rank the options in terms of probability.



*Fred w/ staff warning report*

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